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representation of their client.  We also thank Kirkland & Ellis, LLP for permitting them 
to offer their service.  Lawyers who act pro bono fulfill the highest service that members 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 Joseph Scott, a federal prisoner, appeals from the district court’s order dismissing 
the habeas corpus petition he filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the district court’s order. 
I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Because we write for the parties only, we will recite only as much of the facts and 
procedural history of this case as assist our discussion of this appeal.   
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 In 1999, a federal grand jury in the District of Delaware charged Scott with 
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1)  (Count  1), and possession with intent to distribute cocaine 
base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Count 4).  A jury convicted Scott on both 
Counts. 
  Based on the quantity of drugs involved, Scott faced statutory sentencing ranges 
of 10 years to life imprisonment on Count I, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), and 5 to 40 
years imprisonment on Count 4, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). 
 The Probation Office recommended that the district court sentence Scott as a 
Career Offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, because his criminal history included two 
qualifying predicate Delaware state court convictions: a 1996 drug conviction (a 
“controlled substance offense”) and a 1997 second-degree assault conviction (a “crime of 
violence”).  Those two predicate offenses resulted in a Guidelines sentencing range of 
360 months to life.   Scott objected to the consideration of his drug conviction on the 
ground that he was only 17 years old at the time.  The district court overruled his 
objection, and sentenced Scott as a career offender under the then-mandatory Sentencing 




 On appeal, we affirmed Scott’s conviction in an unpublished opinion, but vacated 
his supervised release term in light of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  
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United States v. Scott, 259 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 2001) (table). On remand, the district court 
resentenced Scott to 360 months imprisonment, to be followed by three years’ supervised 
release.   
 In 2002, Scott filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 
raising five claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.  The district court denied four of 
his claims, and ruled that it would hold an evidentiary hearing on his claim that counsel 
was ineffective for failing to file a petition for a writ of certiorari.  United States v. Scott, 
243 F. Supp.2d  97  (D. Del. 2003).  The district court granted Scott’s motion and issued 
a stipulated order allowing Scott to file a petition for certiorari.  In 2004, the Supreme 
Court denied certiorari.  541 U.S. 1035 (2004). 
 In 2005, Scott filed another § 2255 motion, again alleging ineffective assistance of 
counsel.  Scott v. United States, No. 05-267 (D. Del.).  The district court denied this 
motion as an unauthorized “second or successive” motion.  Id. 
 On March 3, 2011, Scott filed a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60 to reduce his 
sentence based on Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).  There, the Supreme 
Court addressed the definition of “violent felony” for purposes of the Armed Career 
Criminal Act (“ACCA”).3  The Court held that a violent felony must be “roughly similar, 
in kind as well as in degree of risk posed” to burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes 
involving the use of explosives.  553 U.S. at 142-43.  The Court noted that these crimes 
                                              
3
 Authority addressing the definition of “violent felony” under the ACCA, which imposes 
a mandatory prison term upon felons with three prior violent felonies, generally applies to 
the definition of a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines.  United States v. 




all usually involve “purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.”Id. at 144-45 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  Reckless conduct does not qualify as a crime of 
violence after Begay.  United States v. Lee, 612 F.3d 170, 196 (3d Cir. 2010).  In his Rule 
60 motion, Scott argued, for the first time, that his 1997 second degree assault conviction 
was not a “crime of violence,” in view of Begay’s narrowing construction of the term 
“violent felony” in the ACCA, and that he was “innocent” of his career-offender 
sentence. 
 On May 5, 2011, during the pendency of the Rule 60 motion, Scott filed an 
application with us for leave to file a successive § 2255 motion to raise his Begay claim.  
We denied his application, holding that Scott’s claims did not satisfy the requirements of 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(h).
4
  In re Scott, No. 11-2147 (3d Cir. June 2, 2011) (Order).  We 
wrote: 
[Scott’s] application pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) to file a 
second or successive motion to vacate sentence pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 2255 is denied.  [Scott] seeks to present claims that 
he is not a career offender under Begay v. United States, 533 
U.S. 137 (2008), and that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Such claims, however, do not satisfy the 
requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h) because they do not rely 
on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases 
on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was 
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 A district court lacks jurisdiction to consider a successive § 2255 motion unless it is 
certified by a panel of this court to contain a claim of : “(1) newly discovered evidence 
that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have 
found the movant guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made 
retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously 





previously unavailable, or newly discovered evidence that, if 
proven and viewed in the light of the evidence as a whole, 
would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing 
evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found 
Appellant guilty of the offense.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). 
 
Following our denial of Scott’s application, the district court dismissed Scott’s Rule 60 
motion, concluding that it was a disguised successive § 2255 motion. 
 On July 27, 2011, Scott filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 
U.S.C. § 2241 in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, the 
district of his confinement, pursuant to the “safety valve” or “savings clause” provision of 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), renewing his Begay-based sentencing challenge.
5
  On June 11, 
2012, the district court dismissed the § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction, holding that 
Scott was barred from seeking relief under the safety valve provision because he had not 
shown that § 2255 was “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his sentence.” 
Scott v. Warden J.T. Shartle, Civ. No. 11-4298 (D.N.J. June 11, 2012).    
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 Section 2255(e) provides: “An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 
prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this section, shall not 
be entertained it if appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by motion, to 
the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also 
appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his 
detention.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).   
 
6
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  Our review of a 
district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief is de novo. Vego v. United States, 493 F.3d 
310, 314 (3d Cir. 2007). We exercise plenary review over the district court’s legal 
conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard to its findings of fact.  Id.  We review 
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 Upon review, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Scott’s § 2241 
petition for lack of jurisdiction.  Typically, a federal prisoner raises a collateral attack to a 
sentence through 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  See Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120 (3d 
Cir. 2002).  However, a federal prisoner can proceed under § 2241 instead if a § 2255 
motion is “inadequate or ineffective.”  28 U.S.C. § 2255; In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245, 
249 (3d Cir. 1997).  In Dorsainvil, we explained that this “safety valve” applies only in 
rare circumstances, such as when an intervening change in the statute under which the 
petitioner was convicted renders the petitioner’s conduct non-criminal.  Id. at 251 
(explaining that a federal prisoner can use § 2241 where he “had no earlier opportunity to 
challenge his conviction for a crime that an intervening change in substantive law may 
negate.”).   
 As noted at the outset, in his § 2241 petition, Scott argued that he was wrongly 
sentenced under the career offender guideline because one of his predicate convictions, 
viz.., his 1997 second-degree assault conviction, was improperly designated a “crime of 
violence,” in light of the Court’s decision in Begay v. United States, supra.  Scott was 
therefore challenging his career offender designation.   He was not claiming that because 
of an intervening change in the substantive law, he is now innocent of the predicate 
offense he was convicted of.   
 In his appeal, Scott repeats the arguments he made in the district court.   However, 
because he is challenging his career offender designation and is not claiming that he is 
                                                                                                                                                  
dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under a de novo standard.  PennMont 
Secs. v. Frucher, 586 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 2009).    
8 
 
now innocent of the predicate offense, he does not fall within the “safety valve” 
exception created in In re Dorsainvil and cannot proceed under § 2241.  See Okereke, 
307 F.3d at 120-21 (holding that Dorsainvil did not permit petitioner to challenge his 
sentence via § 2241 because his argument was based on intervening change in sentencing 
law and did not render the crime he was convicted of not criminal).   
II. 
 For the above reasons, we will affirm the district court’s order of dismissal.  
 
